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be its "socialist sister republic." The Government-controlled press and radio gave one-sided coverage from which the average person would get the false impression that the crisis was a Cuban-U.S. problem with which the Soviet was not involved. Subsequent to our Ambassador's talk with Keitel the press and radio, although they continued to draw their copy from Simon Malley's one-sided coverage of the developments, began to refrain from direct editorial criticism of the U.S. and tacitly recognized that the Soviets had established bases in Cuba. (11)

after the Istiqlal Party newspaper took the line that U.S. bases should be removed from Morocco because of the possibility they could draw reprisals, and the paper of the National Union of Popular Forces attacked the Government for not taking the position that the U.S. bases should go, the Minister of Information made a statement on October 31. His statement was in the context of the opposition's attacks against the Moroccan Government for having failed to support the Cuban revolution in the United Nations. The Minister was quoted as expressing satisfaction on the part of his Government concerning the detente and emphasizing the U.N. Afro-Asian group's role in resolving the crisis. "That role was determining and the Moroccan delegation to the United Nations acted in concert with the group to safeguard peace, in conformity with the Moroccan principle which requires resolution of conflicts by negotiation." Alluding to the necessity for small countries like Morocco to follow a non-intervention, non-aligned policy, he said that Morocco is satisfied when "the independence of each people is respected and its liberty to have a regime of its own choice" is reaffirmed. (11)

Officially, the position of the Algerian Government during the Cuban crisis was one of strict non-alignment; actually, it was "more neutral" in support of the Cubans than it was understanding of the American position. The most notable stand taken by the Government in carrying out its policy of non-alignment was the flat statement made by Ben Bella to our Charge that no landing or overflight rights would be granted to Soviet planes bound for Cuba with military equipment. The semi-official Algerian position was that Cuba and world peace were menaced by the U.S. quarantine. Even well-disposed Foreign Ministry officials were unwilling to admit the truth was the other way around. After days of listening to pro-Cuban bias on the Algerian radio and television, Embassy Algiers described as an "incredible experience" hearing Algerian broadcasters on October 29 sum up the news as a vindication of U.S. claims regarding the missile bases and attributing Khrushchev's undertaking to remove the bases to the firm stand taken by the U.S.

Guinean officials in private generally expressed understanding and approval of the U.S. actions. The stand against granting Russian landing or overflight rights to Cuba in order not to assist a Soviet military build-up in Cuba preceded and was more forthcoming than the positions of some more friendly African states. Radio Conakry was scrupulously objective in covering Cuban developments.

President Toure said he felt Guinea should support (11)

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At the U.N. General Assembly, the Guinean Ambassador, Dr. Ibrahima Traoré, stated that his country was in solidarity with Cuba and the Government of Guinea. Although he agreed that the situation was serious, he thought "if you handle him intelligently, he is not losing his position on Cuba as expressed in the Political Bureau's Communiqué of November 1961, in view of the Russian admission of the existence of a Soviet base in Cuba and the demand of the Cuban Government for evacuation of the American bases (at Guantanamo) from Cuban soil. The Government of Guinea reaffirms unequivocally its support for the immediate suppression of all these foreign bases." This statement was issued in conjunction with one which failed to recognize Chinese aggression in the Sino-Indian conflict. Taken together, the statements appeared to reflect a Guinean desire to avoid taking sides publicly.

Generally, the UAM states were not taking publicly positions which favored the U.S. At the same time, most of them were making assurances of understanding and sympathy for the U.S. action and indicated that questions of air and landing rights for Soviet aircraft carrying military equipment to Cuba would be decided if these were requested. As a rule, the press and radio in these states attempted to present news of the crisis in a balanced fashion.

President Mba of Gabon (he is also the current President of the UAM) stated that the U.S. could count on the support of Gabon and he felt that all the UAM states in the General Assembly.

Senegalese leaders were sympathetic to the request that the U.S. take action on the Soviet bases. Senegalese criticism was aimed at the existence of U.S. bases in Turkey and the U.S. threat of force. A Senegalese group sent messages to the U.S. and strongly critical of the U.S. and expressed solidarity with Cuban statements. Senegalese expressed private support of the U.S. action against the President had chosen an appropriate site for the attack to draw fire against Soviet aggressiveness. The Senegalese press attempted to show both sides.

President Ould of Mauritania was particularly impressed by the evidence that the Soviet Union introduced into Cuba weapons which directly threatened the free world. He said, Mauritania, in part, hoped the U.S. would stress the facts of the Soviet build-up in Cuba, not to cover emotional pro-Cuban sentiment in Africa and neutral areas. He commented that in any showdown the UAM would find itself on the U.S. side; in the meantime, Mauritanian public statements would stress the desire to end the threat to world peace. Public opinion in

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Nouakchott appeared genuinely troubled by the danger of war and initially identified with the Cuban "underdog." Understanding of the U.S. position improved as the news media concentrated on the evidence of the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba. Radio Mauritania avoided editorial comment in its news broadcasts, which gave satisfactory coverage from the U.S. viewpoint.

The Foreign Minister of Chad recognized that the Soviet actions were unjustifiable. So did the Acting President of Niger. Embassy Cotonou reported there would be no problem in Dahomey for the U.S. in event of a showdown. The Upper Volta Ambassador to the UN said that the Soviet revelation that it had bases in Cuba changed the views of many UN delegates who considered they had been misled by the Soviet and Cuban delegations.

President Ahidjo of Cameroon understood and personally sympathized with the U.S. quarantine action and even felt, as a friend, that our action was rather late. Ahidjo thought we would find it difficult to persuade neutralists, and others not prepared to make a political commitment, of the legality of the quarantine, saying that a solution which equates the two sides may seem reasonable and objective to those unprepared to distinguish between the peaceful, conciliatory conduct of the U.S. in the past 16 years and the constant aggressiveness of the communists. Ahidjo implied he has to deal with a significant number in Cameroon and possibly in the UAM who hold such opinions.

III. Of the remaining African states, Liberia, Uganda, and the South African Republic were officially and publicly strongly pro-U.S. The others took no official position although some of them privately expressed understanding of the U.S. position. Sudan, Libya, Ethiopia, and Congo-Leopoldville were among the first to give assurances that any Soviet requests for landing or overflight rights for aircraft carrying military equipment to Cuba would be denied.

Liberia took a strong official position supporting the U.S. Uganda Premier Obote in a November 1 press conference firmly supported the U.S. decision on the quarantine which, he emphasized, was not a blockade. He compared the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba aimed at the U.S. with a hypothetical placement by a foreign power of aggressive weapons in Zanzibar aimed at Kenya and Uganda, and said he agreed with President Kennedy that, in such a situation, "the greatest danger is to do nothing." The South African Government early sent to the U.S. Government, and also made public, a letter expressing support for the U.S. position. Significant opinion groups in South Africa followed the same line. Only scattered opinion was available from African groups. One survey of African

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man-in-the-street opinion, which did not include the more educated African elements. Reaction was mainly negative - either stating that the crisis did not concern Africans or taking the side of the Soviets on the belief that a Soviet victory would mean liberation of Africans.

Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa issued no public statements but privately wrote conveying to President Kennedy sympathy in the Cuban developments, commending him for taking the matter to the Security Council, and assuring him that the Nigerian representative at the UN would be instructed to cooperate with all member nations in ensuring that the situation would not deteriorate into an armed clash. Both the press and some private conversations indicated that "Turkey for Cuba" was a popular idea in Nigeria, but confidence in the U.S. was also apparent. In a private letter not released publicly Premier Adoula of Congo-Leopoldville said his Government could only align itself with the U.S. position. The latter calls for a stop to sending offensive arms to Cuba and also for the approximation of U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful society.

In Sierra Leone, the Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed our Charge of the Cabinet decision to instruct the Sierra Leone delegation to the UN that "notwithstanding the desirability of consultation with friendly states, the Sierra Leone delegation is not to take any position on the Cuban question in opposition to the U.S." The Minister of Information, giving the impression he spoke for the Cabinet, told our Charge, "We are proud of the courageous stand taken by your President." The Premier of the Sierra Leone told our Charge he "completely agreed" with the necessity of U.S. action. The Charge believed this to be the Premier's personal view, and that the U.S. position was shared officially or publicly expressed by the Sierra Leone Government. President Olympio of Togo was generally sympathetic to the U.S. position but took no official public stand. Privately, he took the view that all the time should be taken to reach a solution through the UN, that it was pointed out to him that some of his country's radio and press organs had taken steps to correct their editorial content to contain no editorial comments and balanced reports on the Cuban situation.

President Bourguiba and other top Tunisian officials privately gave strong endorsement to the U.S. position. The official Tunisian reaction reflected satisfaction with the U.S. position and the U.S. call for a peaceful solution, and that Tunisians from the beginning supported a UN solution. This official position was generally reflected in the press. Over-all Tunisian press coverage was from a pro-U.S. viewpoint, to overemphasize the Khrushchev contribution to solving the crisis, but editorial and other comments made clear that the fact of Soviet deception was recognized. In the leftist press, which is inclined to sympathize with any revolution, the Soviet leadership was too quick to comment on the evils of becoming too closely identified with a particular country.

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The Ethiopian Emperor, in a private statement to our Ambassador November 1, said that while many small countries were initially critical of the U.S. blockade of Cuba, he believed the U.S. action is now understood and supported by most of the free world. He termed the U.S. decision "courageous and correct."

In Sudan,

There was no public, official statement of support for the U.S. position. Both the Sudanese Government and press publicly took the line that foreign bases are provocative and that, irrespective of this fact, nuclear war is unjustified. President Abboud's statement reiterated his Government's "firmest opposition to military bases irrespective of their location, their purpose, or the side which constructs them." It continued: "Therefore we consider that the UN is the place to treat the Cuban problem and that it is incumbent on all states which are parties to the dispute . . . to refrain from any unilateral action which would affect UN resolutions or hamper their practical application." The press repeated and expanded these themes.

The Libyan position was one of cautious approval of the U.S. policy.

The Tripoli press confined itself mostly to news accounts; Benghazi press reaction was mixed and generally unfavorable. While some understanding of the U.S. position and some criticism of Russian methods appeared, the primary theme was that the great powers were callously disregarding the rest of mankind in bringing the world to the brink of thermonuclear war; the press gave credit to the neutral nations and the UN for restraining the great powers on this occasion.

RUSK

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(Page One)

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ALL AF Posts

FROM: Department of State

SUBJECT: African Reaction to the Cuban Crisis

I. The "Casablanca powers" did not take a coordinated position on the Cuban situation. In some instances, however, their individual positions were parallel. Algeria and Guinea, for example, privately indicated that any Soviet requests for overflight and landing rights for aircraft carrying military equipment to Cuba would be denied. Press and radio output was, in general, critical of the U.S. role regarding Cuba, but Radio Conakry, in Guinea, was scrupulously objective.

Ghana's reaction on Cuba was characterized by a "neutralism" slanted in favor of the Soviets, with the Government-controlled Ghanaian Times and Radio Ghana strident in their criticism of the U.S. Nkrumah agreed, however, that Ambassador Quaison-Sackey's speech to the Security Council criticizing the U.S. for establishing the quarantine but making no unfavorable comment on Soviet and Cuban actions, was not appropriate to Ghana's non-aligned position, and said he would correct this. Later, according to [excised] to whom Nkrumah showed the aerial photographs of the missile bases in Cuba, Nkrumah was obviously shaken and remarked that he and his Government had been deceived by the Soviets.

Mali's reaction was not that of a genuine neutral. In a letter to President Kennedy, President Keita expressed the opinion that the U.S. did not exhaust the machinery of the United Nations before imposing the quarantine.

[Excised]

(Page Three)

the U.S. on the question of the Russian bases in line with its opposition to foreign bases in neutral territory, but he said that for the same reason he sided with Castro on Guantanamo. Although he agreed Castro is no longer neutral, he thought, "if you handle him intelligently he is not lost." Guinea's official position on Cuba as expressed in the Political Bureau's communique of November 6 was that, in view of the Russian admission of the existence of a Soviet base in Cuba and the demand of the Cuban Government for evacuation of the American base (at Guantanamo) from Cuban soil, "the Government of Guinea reaffirms unequivocally its support for the immediate suppression of all these foreign bases." This statement was issued in conjunction with one which failed to recognize Chinese aggression in the Sino-Indian conflict. Taken together, the statements appeared to reflect a Guinean desire to avoid taking sides publicly.

II. Generally the UAM states avoided taking publicly positions which favored the U.S. At the same time, most of them privately offered reassurances of understanding and sympathy for the U.S. action and indicated that overflight and landing rights for Soviet aircraft carrying military equipment to Cuba would be denied if these were requested. As a rule, the press and radio in these states attempted to present news of the crisis in a balanced fashion.

President Mba of Gabon (he is also the current President of the UAM) stated that the U.S. could count on the support of Gabon and he felt sure, all the UAM states in the General Assembly.


Senegalese leaders were sympathetic to the reasons which led the U.S. to take action on the Soviet missile base. The main force of individual Senegalese criticism was aimed at the existence of U.S. bases in Turkey and by the U.S. threat of force. One student group sent messages to the Embassy strongly critical of the U.S. and expressing solidarity with Cuban students. Numerous Senegalese expressed privately support of the U.S. action; some said the President had chosen an appropriate situation in which to draw a line against Soviet aggressiveness. The Senegalese press and radio attempted to show both sides.

President Ould Daddah of Mauritania was particularly impressed by the evidence that the Soviets had introduced into Cuba weapons which directly threatened the free world of which, he said, Mauritania is part. He hoped the U.S. would stress the facts of the Soviet build-up in Cuba so as to overcome emotional pro-Cuban sentiment in African and neutral areas. He commented that in any showdown the UAM would find itself on the U.S. side; in the meantime, Mauritanian public statements would stress the desire to end the threat to world peace. Public opinion in

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AIRCRANE



NOV 21 11 47 AM '62

FROM: Department of Defense
SUBJECT: African Reaction to the Cuban Crisis

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5	10	3
12	8	3

I. The... position on the...
... however, ... positions
... Algeria, ...
... indicated that ... requests for
... and landing rights for aircraft carrying
... military equipment to Cuba, ...
... output was, in general, critical of the
... role regarding Cuba, ...
... was especially ...
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in favor of the Soviets, with the Government-controlled Ghanaian Times
and Radio Ghana ... in their ... of the U.S. ... agreed,
however, that ... speech to the Security Council
criticizing the ... but making no
... was not appropriate
... correct this.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

REVIEWED BY: *[Signature]* DATE: 3/19/63

- () RELEASE
- (X) EXCISE
- () DENY
- () DECLASSIFY IN PART
- () Non-responsive
- () For EO 12958

... was not that of a genuine neutral. In a letter to
... President Keita expressed the opinion that the U.S.
... the machinery of the United Nations before imposing the

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APR 11 1963 / NOV 11 1962 : Henry J. Tasca

AFI - Mr. MacKnight : AFI - Mr. Sherry

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Officially, the position of the Algerian Government during the Cuban crisis was one of strict non-alignment; actually, it was "more neutral" in support of the Cubans than it was understanding of the American position. The most notable stand taken by the Government in carrying out its policy of non-alignment was the flat statement made by Ben Bella to our Charge that no landing or overflight rights would be granted to Soviet planes bound for Cuba with military equipment. The semi-official Algerian position was that Cuba and world peace were menaced by the U.S. quarantine. Even well-disposed Foreign Ministry officials were unwilling to admit the truth was the other way around. After days of listening to pro-Cuban bias on the Algerian radio and television, Embassy Algiers described as an "incredible experience" hearing Algerian broadcasters on October 29 sum up the news as a vindication of U.S. claims regarding the missile bases and attributing Khrushchev's undertaking to remove the bases to the firm stand taken by the U.S.

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201

Guinean officials' position on Cuba as expressed in the Political Bureau's Communiqué of November 6 was that, in view of the Russian admission of the existence of a Soviet base in Cuba and the demand of the Cuban Government for evacuation of the American base (at Guantanamo) from Cuban soil, "the Government of Guinea reaffirms unequivocally its support for the immediate suppression of all these foreign bases." This statement was issued in conjunction with one which failed to recognize Chinese aggression in the Sino-Indian conflict. Taken together, the statements appeared to reflect a Guinean desire to avoid taking sides publicly.

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201

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Public opinion in

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Both the press and some private conversations indicated that "Turkey for Cuba" was a popular idea in Nigeria, but confidence in the U.S. has also appeared.

The official Tunisian Government reaction reflected satisfaction that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had agreed on a peaceful solution, and that Tunisia had from the beginning supported a UN solution. This official position was generally reflected in the press. Over-all Tunisian press coverage, from our viewpoint, to overemphasize the Khrushchev contribution to saving the peace, but editorial and other comment made clear that the fact of Soviet dignity was recognized. In the leftist press which is inclined to sympathize with any revolution, the Soviet leadership led to comment on the evils of becoming too closely identified with a side.

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In Sudan,

There was ~~no~~ official statement of support for the U.S. position. Both the Sudanese Government and press publicly took the line that foreign bases are provocative and that, irrespective of this fact, nuclear war is unjustified. President Abboud's statement reiterated his Government's "firmest opposition to military bases irrespective of their location, their purpose, or the side which constructs them." It continued: "Therefore we consider that the UN is the place to treat the Cuban problem and that it is incumbent on all States which are parties to the dispute . . . to refrain from any unilateral action which would affect UN resolutions or hamper their practical application." The press repeated and expanded these themes.

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